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Abstract 
 
Compared to the disappointment of the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen the results of the 
recent Conferences of the Parties (COPs) can be regarded as positive progress. This was made 
possible due to lesson drawing and learning among states. Recent evidence from the UNFCCC 
negotiations suggests that countries began to reflect on the ‘Copenhagen experience’, are setting 
up domestic climate legislation in the form of low carbon development plans and are sharing 
their knowledge and experiences in the international climate negotiations. Country representa-
tives engage in workshops and roundtables to showcase their mitigation plans and low carbon 
development initiatives, thereby raising ambitions and creating group pressure on other coun-
tries. This article examines how the diffusion of policies across countries is motivated and facili-
tated by knowledge transfer and learning within multilevel-reinforcing governance dynamics be-
tween the domestic level and international negotiations. It analyses how changes in the negotia-
tion setting from confrontational formal negotiations to a more open forum and bottom-up 
pledge-and-review process, in combination with a positively framed win-win low carbon eco-
nomic development narrative resulted in the diffusion of climate policies across developed and 
developing countries. Communicating these climate initiatives on the national level has shifted 
the debate. Countries emphasize less the win-lose perspective of economic costs and sacrifice. 
Thus they focus less on the question of ‘who should reduce emissions’, but identify co-benefits 
instead. The institutionalized knowledge sharing within the UNFCCC is also creating positive 
competitive dynamics among countries to increase their ambition and take on a leadership role. 
This shift in the negotiations carries potential for a more ambitious aggregate negotiation out-
come and opens up a window of opportunity.  
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Abbreviations 
 
 
AWG-ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
AWG-KP Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties  
under the Kyoto Protocol 
AWG-LCA Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the  
Convention  
COP  Conference of Parties 
EU  European Union 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
NAMAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions  
NGO  Nongovernmental Organization 
UN  United Nations 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
 
 
Efforts to limit climate change are at crossroads. On the international level, a 
patchwork approach of disintegrated regimes is emerging with more or less coordinated 
measures on the local, national and regional levels involving different actors. This is 
frequently referred to as ‘fragmentation’ (Biermann et al. 2009) of the global envi-
ronmental governance architecture, an  emerging ‘bottom-up approach’ (Rayner 2010), 
‘building-blocs’ (Falkner et al. 2010), a ‘climate regime complex’ (Keohane and Victor 
2011) or could be regarded as development in the tradition of two-level games (Putnam 
1988). Key arenas are the UNFCCC, G8/ G20 and regional actors (Kim and Chung 
2012). 
The results of the recent COPs can be regarded as a positive progress when com-
pared to the disappointment of the 2009 UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen. This pro-
gress was made possible due to learning from experience among states. Recent evidence 
from the UNFCCC negotiations suggests that countries began to reflect and draw les-
sons from the ‘Copenhagen experience’. They are increasingly accepting that all coun-
tries need to contribute to climate mitigation. To achieve the corresponding climate 
treaty, countries are willing to accept modifications to the negotiation process by engag-
ing in workshops and roundtables to showcase their mitigation action and low carbon 
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development initiatives, thereby raising ambitions and sharing their experiences. This ar-
ticle examines how the diffusion of policies across countries is motivated and facilitated 
by knowledge transfer and learning within multilevel-reinforcing governance dynamics. 
It analyses how changes in the negotiation setting from confrontational formal 
negotiations to a more open forum combined with a positively framed win-win low car-
bon economic development narrative results in the diffusion of climate policies across 
developed and developing countries. Communicating these climate initiatives on the in-
ternational level shifted the debate. Countries emphasize less the win-lose perspective of 
economic costs and sacrifice, thus focusing less on the question of ‘who should reduce 
emissions’. Instead of this ‘win-lose’ mindset (Gupta 2012) they are increasingly asking 
about co-benefits on ‘how can we all reduce emissions and create sustainable economic 
growth?’ The institutionalized knowledge sharing within the UNFCCC is also creating 
positive competitive dynamics among countries to increase their ambition and take on a 
leadership role. This shift in the negotiations carries potential for a more ambitious ag-
gregate negotiation outcome. The key hypothesis is that the diffusion of policies across 
countries is facilitated by international negotiations such as those within the UNFCCC, 
where countries are encouraged to present their national efforts and progress towards 
implementation. The UNFCCC has taken on the role of a forum to showcase countries’ 
mitigation and adaptation activities, thus leading to positive reinforcement effects and 
group pressure.  
To this end, this contribution analyses the reinforcing dynamics between the in-
ternational level of climate negotiations within the UNFCCC and the national level of 
domestic climate legislation. It widens the analytical lens to include climate measures on 
the national level and emerging patterns of institutionalized knowledge transfer (Dolow-
itz and Marsh 1996; Zito and Schout 2009) within the UNFCCC. This dynamic has the 
potential to evolve into lesson-drawing (Rose 1991, 1993) or even policy-learning (Ben-
nett and Howlett 1992; May 1992; Zito and Schout 2009), making policy success from 
the normative perspective more likely as it contributes to changing the prevailing under-
standing of climate change as a distributive problem (Gupta 2012) towards a win-win 
opportunity for sustainable development.  
The first part reviews the most relevant academic literature on learning in policy-
making, the top-down approach to addressing climate change based on regime theory 
and the bottom-up approach of the economic benefits from investment in low carbon 
economic development based on the emerging green growth literature. It introduces the 
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theoretical framework on pathways in complex governance by Bernstein and Cashore 
(2012) as basis for the empirical analysis. Following the methodology section, the fourth 
part discusses countries’ climate legislation and low carbon development plans. The fifth 
section draws attention to an emerging pattern of lesson-drawing in the UNFCCC nego-
tiations, which increasingly serves as forum for countries to showcase their low carbon 
economic development strategies and engage in policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996, 2012; Rose 1991, 1993). The final section concludes by discussing the resulting 
opportunity for reframing the international negotiations towards a ‘win-win’ narrative of 
understanding climate change mitigation as chance for sustainable, low carbon eco-
nomic development and as an opportunity to focus on the co-benefits as countries al-
ready do in their national climate legislation.  
 
 
 
2 Links between climate governance, green growth and learning  
 
 
2.1 The global climate governance literature 
 
Scholars concluded from the Copenhagen Accords that the approach of negotiating a 
comprehensive post-2012 climate agreement failed (e.g. Winkler and Beaumont 2010) 
mostly due to institutional dysfunctions of the UNFCCC monopoly (Keohane and Victor 
2011, p. 15). Further reasons were the lack of inclusive leadership provided by some 
chairpersons when introducing compromise draft-texts and not allowing the parties suf-
ficient time for discussions (Müller 2011) as well as institutional path-dependencies (for 
detailed analyses see Grubb 2011; Gupta 2012; Kjellén 2008; Rayner 2010; Rajamani 
2012). This theoretical perspective prevails although the Cancun Agreements represent 
significant progress in the measure of UNFCCC’s incremental steps thanks to the trans-
parent and inclusive steering approach demonstrated by the Mexican COP-16 and South 
African COP-17 presidency and the shared desire of delegates to get any agreement at 
the Cancun COP-16 conference (Grubb 2011). Incremental, small steps are not the best 
option, but the only way the climate regime is currently evolving (Bodansky and Dir-
inger 2010; Urpelainen 2013) due to constraints in its institutional architecture (Bier-
mann et al. 2010; Hare et al. 2010) such as consensus-based decision-making. This ef-
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fectively grants each of the 194 countries a veto right (Keohane and Victor 2011). The 
UNFCCC can be regarded as a typical UN decision-making body. Its consensus-based 
decision-making structure means that all decisions meet the smallest common denomi-
nator and thus allow a high legitimacy (Buchanan and Keohane 1999), but it also means 
that the UNFCCC is locked-into a strong incrementalism regarding its (in-)ability to de-
liver the strong, legally binding agreement called for by the IPCC and the public. In 
short, its institutional architecture prohibited the UNFCCC in 2009 from delivering.  
 
 
2.2 Low carbon development literature 
 
The emerging green growth or low carbon (economic) development literature fo-
cuses on how countries can combine climate mitigation with economic development 
(Bowen and Fankhauser 2011a, 2011b; Jacobs 2012; Jänicke and Jacob 2009; Zenghelis 
2011). It stands in the tradition of the Ecological Modernization literature focused on co-
benefits between environmental protection and economic growth (e.g. Mol 1996; Lanoie 
et al. 2008; Porter and van der Linde 1995). This literature argues that economic growth 
and climate mitigation are not mutually exclusive, but there can be co-benefits for 
achieving both objectives if regulation corrects market failures and internalizes the costs 
of environmental externalities (Porter and van der Linde 1995). These include market-
based instruments and technology-pull policies by governments to stimulate private in-
vestment in low-carbon transport, energy efficiency and renewable energies (Zenghelis 
2011). Proponents emphasize that investment in clean technologies and projects contrib-
uting to carbon mitigation support economic growth, the creation of jobs (Jänicke and 
Jacob 2009) and poverty reduction. This win-win approach of green growth on a macro-
economic scale is embraced by an increasing number of governments (Mathews 2012; 
Zhang 2011) on the national level, which remained independent from the continuing 
dominance of countries’ ‘win-lose’ perspective of historic responsibilities within the 
UNFCCC between 2008 and 2011 as illustrated by Hallding et al. (2011) and Walsh et 
al. (2011). Academics who are also involved in policy making however are beginning to 
carefully map out how participation in the form of taking on commitments in the future 
could look like (Dubash 2012; Zhang 2011). 
Both the international relations and the environmental economics literature refer 
to an emerging bottom-up approach in the climate regime, but rarely combine the pros-
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pect of using low carbon development strategies to overcome the deadlock in the inter-
national climate negotiations. This could be achieved via shifting the ‘win-lose’ narra-
tive of costs and sacrifice linked to carbon mitigation efforts within UNFCCC (Gupta 
2012) towards a positive ‘win-win’ approach of green growth, economic prosperity and 
job creation based on the investment in clean technologies and a quicker catch-up to the 
best available technologies at reasonably low costs in developing countries.  
 
 
2.3 Lesson drawing, policy transfer and learning from experience 
 
 
The international climate negotiations and domestic low carbon development litera-
tures rarely link with each other. One exception is Bernstein and Cashore’s (2012) four 
pathways of influence from the international to the domestic level. The first pathway is 
via international rules, either in the form of hard or soft law that result in compliance on 
the domestic level. These rules need not be issue specific, but can have co-benefits from 
another area (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 590). The second pathway leads along 
international norms and discourse with a norm-guided ‘logic of appropriateness’ and a 
consequence-guided ‘logic of consequences’ (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 591). 
Norms can also be disseminated via learning among actors resulting from interaction in 
transnational networks and at international conferences. The third pathway is via mar-
kets that influence consumer behaviour and thus domestic policy (Bernstein and Cashore 
2012, p. 593). The fourth pathway is to directly access and influence the domestic policy 
making process via capacity building, i.e. the transfer of knowledge and provision of 
support to local actors sharing the same objectives (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 593-
594). This is especially relevant with regards to policy learning when international ef-
forts try to “build learning fora and training about how to produce improved envi-
ronmental, social and economic performance ‘on the ground’” (Bernstein and Cashore 
2012, p. 594). Policy learning can occur in the decision-making process when stake-
holder networks diffuse knowledge among government and non-governmental actors. It 
stimulates opportunities to benefit sustainability by uncovering “win-win opportunities 
that otherwise would fail to emerge owing to perceived conflicts” (Bernstein and 
Cashore 2012, p. 594). 
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This contribution extends the pathways-framework from a ‘one-way-street’ into a 
cycle: the domestic initiatives that were stimulated by the international level facilitate 
convergence of positions in the international negotiations in the next round. Since states 
are already implementing appropriate policies on the domestic level and know how they 
can meet either existing or anticipated international commitments, they are more in-
clined to accept actual or further commitments in future negotiation rounds. Domestic 
experiences and knowledge on combining climate mitigation with economic develop-
ment diffuse from the domestic level to the international negotiations, where other states 
pick up on those ideas. The international negotiations turn into a forum for knowledge 
transfer on domestic experiences. This enables countries to showcase their domestic ac-
tions as ‘climate leaders’. Countries consequently learn from each other’s successes and 
failures in implementing climate legislation. This builds up group pressure on ‘laggards’ 
to also develop and implement strategies as they are ‘put in the spotlight’.  
Learning in the sense of knowledge and experience transfer is a key determinant in 
the norms-based and capacity building pathways (Bernstein and Cashore 2012). The ba-
sis to learning is drawing lessons from experience with policy programmes in other 
countries or levels of governance (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Rose 1993). Lesson draw-
ing is not an innovation itself but rather the utilisation of available experience (Rose 
1991, 1993). It can occur by looking to other countries or levels of governance for solu-
tions and evaluating whether these policies would also work in the specific domestic 
context. Lessons can be drawn from success stories and from failures regarding what 
mistakes to avoid (Rose 1991, p. 20-21). There are five possible modes of lesson draw-
ing. Countries could simply copy the other policy, i.e. horizontally adopt an existing pol-
icy (Rose 1991, p. 21) or emulate it by adoption with modifications for the national 
framework conditions (Rose 1991, p. 21). They can also use hybridisation by combining 
two policies, synthesis by combining several elements of several policies, or inspiration, 
where other policies serve only as intellectual stimulus for a new policy (Rose 1991, p. 
22). Lesson drawing is a process in which decision-makers voluntarily draw lessons 
from one or more countries and apply the positive or negative conclusions to their own 
policymaking. In contrast, policy transfer can also be forced upon decision-makers via 
supra-institutional actors, i.e. international rules (Bernstein and Cashore 2012). Conse-
quently, lesson drawing can be seen as one aspect of policy transfer (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996, p. 344).  
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The exchange of experiences with low carbon economic development plans on the 
international level can also potentially result in learning from experiences, for which to 
occur states need to reflect upon the policies presented to them and think about their use-
fulness for their domestic needs (May 1992; Zito and Schout 2009). Learning would oc-
cur if countries not only copied or adopted policies because they were pressured to do so 
as emphasised by the policy transfer literature (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996), but because 
they reflected on the activities of other countries and understand how they can move on 
a cleaner economic development path. Countries would thus also change their policy be-
liefs (Sabatier 1987, 1988) from focusing on economic sacrifices related to climate miti-
gation (win-lose) towards embracing co-benefits for sustainable economic development 
(win-win). Over time, we would also expect to see a change in secondary beliefs (Sa-
batier 1987, 1988) regarding policy details. The following sections analyze how and 
why the climate negotiations are showing indications of multilevel-reinforcement proc-
esses and interdependencies between international agreements and domestic climate leg-
islation.  
 
 
 
3 Methodology  
 
 
The empirical analysis examines the relationship between climate legislation on 
the domestic level (independent variable) and the shift towards a ‘win-win framing’ in 
the international negotiations as dependent variable. The data was collected and ana-
lyzed between 2009 and 2013 using a qualitative sequential approach that allowed modi-
fications to the original research design based on new additional data (King et al. 1994, 
p. 22) and a high number of observations within a single case-study design (King et al. 
1994, p. 51).  
The data includes 40 interviews with government representatives from developed 
and developing countries with at least two representatives from each negotiation bloc 
and is supplemented with information based on participant observation conducted by the 
author in 92 1.5-3 hour UNFCCC negotiation sessions such as plenary sessions, working 
groups, contact groups, informals, stakeholder roundtables, side events and workshops/ 
roundtables scheduled as part of the official UNFCCC meetings between 2009 and 
2013. The researcher took notes of statements made by negotiators during these sessions 
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and transcribed a number of negotiation sessions that were web-streamed via the 
UNFCCC website for textual analysis. This primary data was supplemented with docu-
ment analysis of the Earth Negotiation Bulletin publications of the UNFCCC confer-
ences between 2009 and 2012 (IISD 2007-2012). The data on national climate legisla-
tion is based on the GLOBE/ LSE study on climate legislation in 33 countries (Town-
shend et al. 2013). This primary and secondary data was coded using qualitative text 
analysis software and triangulated (Esterberg 2002) to answer the key research ques-
tions.  
 
 
 
4 Moving forward on the national level: domestic climate legislation  
 
 
 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and many more countries including Ethi-
opia and the Maldives are implementing low carbon economic development plans that 
were legislated in anticipation of a global agreement at the Copenhagen summit in 2009 
or in response to the Copenhagen Accords and Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010). 
Table 1 provides an overview of this recent climate legislation and the number of 
climate-related laws (Townshend et al. 2013). Developing countries set up fairly pro-
gressive climate legislation although they are not required to do so under the UNFCCC. 
The Cancun Agreements only encouraged developed countries, but the voluntary nature 
of NAMAs (UNFCCC 2012a) for developing countries triggered the development of 
climate legislation, which is predominantly framed as green growth or low carbon eco-
nomic development (Upadhayaya 2010). Many of the climate laws address areas of co-
benefits for climate mitigation/ adaptation and domestic priorities such as the protection 
of natural resources, carbon pricing, energy supply, adaptation, research and develop-
ment and strengthening institutions and can thus be understood as climate policy integra-
tion. In the domestic debate, countries such as China (Zhang 2011), South Korea 
(Mathews 2012) and South Africa (Resnick et al. 2012) frame their climate legislation as 
green growth and low carbon economic development, while India for example focuses 
on co-benefits for poverty alleviation (PMCoCC 2008).  	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Table 1. National low carbon economic development plans/ climate legislation. Based on Town-
shend et al. (2013, p. 23-24). State of national legislation by October 2012; BAU = Business as 
Usual; RE = Renewable Energies; EE = Energy Efficiency. 
 
The number of climate-related laws increased since 1990 both in developed 
countries and in developing countries (Townshend et al 2013, p. 20). Three distinct 
peaks coincide with the implementation of the Kyoto protocol (1998-2006), anticipation 
of a legally binding climate treaty (2007-2009) and the emerging bottom-up approach of 
countries setting up legislation that falls into the category of voluntary initiatives follow-
ing the ‘failure’ of COP-15 (2010 onwards). While Annex-1 countries to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol such as EU member states are predominantly implementing their international 
commitments,1 the mere fact that developing countries set up climate legislation given 
the absence of international rules indicates an emerging ‘win-win’ mindset on the na-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Emphasized by multiple interviewees, e.g. European Commission (EC) 1, 2011; EC 2, 2011; EC 3, 
2011; EC 4, 2011; EC 5, 2012; EC6, 2012; EC7, 2012; Member of European Parliament (MEP) 1, 2012; 
MEP 2, 2012. 
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tional level, pointing towards explanations from the three alternative pathways of inter-
national norms, markets and capacity building (Bernstein and Cashore 2012).  
Several developments on the international level explain this diffusion of climate 
legislation. First, the shift in the debate to include developing countries into emission re-
duction commitments as major greenhouse gas emitters of the 21st century had an impact 
on many developing countries to address climate change with legislation either in the 
run-up to the major 2009 climate change conference in Copenhagen or right afterwards. 
While national motivations differ, the timely proximity to the global peak attention on 
the climate change summit with over 100 heads of states participating indicates a certain 
‘deadline’ pressure on countries to consider how they can adapt to the unavoidable con-
sequences of climate change and develop with lower emission intensity (Interview find-
ings 2010-2013). Secondly, the high political profile of the Copenhagen summit also 
“has been an eye opener to many of the attending politicians – particularly from the 
smaller developing countries – as to the importance accorded to climate change in other 
countries” (Müller 2011, p. 8). Furthermore, harvesting the ‘low hanging fruits’ of en-
ergy efficiency and co-benefits between renewable energy and energy security provided 
a further motivation, which is reflected in developing countries’ climate change legisla-
tion as the Indian example illustrates (PMCoCC 2008).  
This development can be explained with the pathways of influence of complex glob-
al governance on domestic policies introduced by Bernstein and Cashore (2012). For 
developed countries, who are predominantly listed in Annex-1 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the domestic climate legislation can be understood as implementation of “binding obli-
gations on states through international law” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 591), while 
the Cancun Agreements as non-binding international norm also created a “logic of ap-
propriateness” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 592) for the developing countries. These 
agreed to set up and report NAMAs to the UNFCCC and consequently faced external 
pressures to also adapt domestic policies. The case of domestic climate legislation in de-
veloping countries pre-dating the Cancun Agreements (see Townshend et al. 2013, p. 
20) however points towards another aspect: the anticipation of international norms. 
This analysis of emerging domestic climate legislation in both developed and devel-
oping countries indicates governance dynamics on multiple levels, which in the case of 
the EU already resulted in reinforcing dynamics. However, the developing countries’ 
negotiation positions have for a long time remained – and to a great extent still are - 
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relatively static on the international level within the traditional win-lose mindset of shar-
ing burdens, costs associated with mitigation efforts and reduced economic growth 
(IISD 2007-2013). Furthermore, finance and economic ministries that are frequently in 
charge of development issues often remain reluctant to embrace the low carbon devel-
opment ‘win-win’ narrative and point towards the short-term economic benefits of the 
business-as-usual approach. This is also a reason why the Rio+20 Summit in 2012 re-
mained far behind expectations in its outcomes – these negotiations were still caught in 
the dominant 1990s framing of economic sacrifice and short-term losses while countries 
were already doing more low carbon development on the domestic level than they were 
willing to politically commit to in the high-level intergovernmental negotiations.2  
 
 
 
5 Multilevel reinforcement via lesson-drawing in the UNFCCC  
 
 
Mutual exchange of experiences with national climate legislation is taking place 
at the ‘margins’ of the UNFCCC negotiations where government representatives engage 
with each other and nongovernmental actors in side-events and stakeholder dialogues. 
These meetings facilitate information exchange on domestic climate mitigation and ad-
aptation activities and thus provide the opportunity for best-practice learning, lesson-
drawing and even policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Rose 1991, 1993; Zito and 
Schout 2009). These learning forums focus on diffusing experiences on how improved 
environmental, economic and social performance can be produced on the domestic level. 
Agents of learning are members of the policy network, who are most influential when 
they manage to uncover “win-win opportunities that otherwise would fail to emerge ow-
ing to perceived conflicts” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 594). The following section 
thus widens the analysis beyond the current negotiation positions of key actors to an-
other function of the UNFCCC as forum to exchange ideas and receive input from non-
governmental actors. A different picture of lesson-drawing and experience exchange 
emerges. This can result in a process that reinforces ambitions in the international nego-
tiations based on the knowledge that countries can in fact deliver on their international 
commitments. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 IISD, 2007-2013; Interviews with developing country representatives, 2009-2011; participant observa-
tion 2009-2012 at UNFCCC conferences and Rio+20 in June 2012. 
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5.1 Low carbon development emerged at the periphery of the negotiations 
 
 
The ‘win-win’ narrative of low carbon development found its way to the ‘periph-
ery’ of the UNFCCC Bonn negotiations in 2011 and has been strongly advocated by dif-
ferent groups of actors. Ban Ki Moon as UN Secretary General calls at the highest level 
for a ‘green new deal’ since COP-14 in Poland and welcomed India’s national climate 
change strategy (UN 2008). Especially the 2009 G8(+5) summit in L’Aquila/Italy 
marked the introduction of low carbon narratives into the climate debate at the heads of 
states level (Interview with senior advisor in G8 delegation 2011). Before the anniver-
sary of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the former UNFCCC Executive Secretary Ivo de 
Boer emphasised Ban Ki Moons’ opportunity to mainstream green growth into sustain-
able development and bring the fight against climate change to the heart of the United 
Nations (DeBoer 2011). Ivo de Boer and the current UNFCCC Executive Secretary 
Christina Figueres emphasise the importance of green growth and low carbon develop-
ment at almost every opportunity (IISD 2007-2013). They call on all countries to raise 
ambitions to close the gap towards the 2°C target through international cooperation and 
to formalize these pledges into an international agreement (DeBoer 2010; Figueres 
2011).  
After overcoming their disappointment regarding the low ambition of the Copen-
hagen Accords, nongovernmental actors as representatives of civil society also played an 
important role in promoting green growth strategies at the ‘margins’ of the UNFCCC 
negotiations and communicating their position to government representatives. For ex-
ample, stakeholders of civil society ranging from environmental NGOs to industry asso-
ciations agreed at a workshop with government representatives from Mexico, South 
Africa and the EU that the discussions on mitigation too often focuses on costs, loss of 
jobs and GDP and that increased efforts need to be directed at “framing mitigation as a 
positive opportunity for creating jobs and ‘green growth’” (Rambharos and Yamin 2011, 
p. 1) as the way forward on the longer term, while recognizing that NAMAs by develop-
ing countries are already substantial. The involvement of nongovernmental actors such 
as experts from environmental NGOs, academics and representatives of local and re-
gional governments facilitates the process of information exchange via capacity building 
and additional experiences from the city and regional level.  
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These positive reinforcing dynamics first emerged after the Cancun Agreements en 
route to the Durban negotiations in 2011, when the Mexican and South African presi-
dencies organised several round tables at the Bonn Climate Change negotiations in June 
2011 (IISD 2007-2013). The information exchange and knowledge transfer however 
remained outside the formal negotiations, which were still locked into the win-lose nar-
rative dominant since the 1990s.  
 
 
5.2 Moving towards the core of the negotiations 
 
 
By May 2013 these reinforcing dynamics diffused into the core of the UNFCCC ne-
gotiations. The two traditional negotiation streams, the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA, had 
been closed and replaced by the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action towards a 2015 
agreement (ADP). States had agreed to change the negotiation process towards an open 
workshop and roundtable structure including the participation of experts. These pro-
vided input in the form presentations to stimulate the negotiators’ thinking. What would 
traditionally have been a ‘side event’ became the ‘core event’ as no other negotiations or 
parallel work streams were scheduled that would have diverted the negotiator’s attention 
(UNFCCC 2013a). At the core of the week-long negotiations were workshops and 
roundtables on topics such as low carbon development, raising ambitions for mitigation, 
forestry, agriculture and technology transfer. The purpose was to encourage the negotia-
tors to “offer reflections on [their] own experiences of implementing low emission 
strategies at various levels and to use this opportunity to discuss best practices and suc-
cess stories at the national and international level” (Facilitator/ UNFCCC 2013a).  
Not only developed countries participated and presented their achievements, but also 
developing countries that are under no obligation by the convention to set up any climate 
legislation. They also explained the rationale behind their climate legislation and shared 
their experience of setting up the process with the intention to help other countries better 
understand how they can design climate legislation: 
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In Kenya, broadly speaking business has been the driver for mainstreaming actions into the 
development plan of the country. The impact of climate change was significant for us to pre-
sent it to the planning ministry and for them to understand what would happen if we would 
not take that into consideration. (…) The other thing that helped us was the leadership of the 
ministry of environment. The minister helped us engaging with the ministers of finance and 
energy on that high level. So experts on these ministries were given instructions from their 
bosses on how to integrate climate change concerns into the process. Awareness created by 
NGOs since Copenhagen also helped. (…) This led to a legislation that made it through the 
parliament.  
(Kenya/UNFCCC 2013a) 
 
Kenya emphasized that in the context of the ADP “it is important that we increase 
ambition from the perspective of the developing and the developed countries, build con-
fidence and trust as we move along” (Kenya/ UNFCCC 2013a). Unlike in previous ne-
gotiation rounds, where developing country negotiators refused to discuss measures that 
may lead to emission reduction in their countries while pointing towards the historical 
responsibility of developed countries (IISD 2007-2012), the question shifted from 
‘whether’ developing countries should or should not reduce their emissions towards a 
goal-oriented information sharing of ‘how’ they can move towards a cleaner develop-
ment pathway. One key example is the contribution of the Chinese chief negotiator 
when he explained the rationale behind climate mitigation and adaptation related meas-
ures of the 12th five year plan: 
 
We regard low carbon development as innovation of the development pathway. Given that 
the two fundamental conventional pathways of the past 300 years, the first one of conven-
tional technologies, has reached a level of 20 ton [CO2] per capita and the second reached 
about 10 ton [CO2] per capita. So now the challenge to developing countries like China is 
that we can’t repeat the first two paths of development of the today industrialized countries. 
The world cannot afford such a high emission pathway. We are aware of the need to create a 
new innovative pathway for low carbon development. This is our vision to shape our strategy 
and to create technologies, policies and institutional arrangements to achieve that. Then we 
try to look at the goal and the solution. Yes, the goal should be ambitious, but we also need to 
find a feasible solution. (…) Having said that, I want to invite you to bless us and to support 
us, so let’s work together for low carbon economic development. 
(China/UNFCCC 2013a) 
 
 
 
Negotiators also recognize their limitations to influence climate legislation and 
low carbon development on the domestic level. Key challenges are access to capital and 
technologies. They emphasize that “the people who should be in the room are finance 
and energy experts” (Nauru/ UNFCCC 2013a). Reflecting on the input, developed and 
developing countries asked to continue this novel approach to  
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Build on this very constructive formal workshop and invite parties to share experiences of 
implementing low carbon and mitigation strategies. We should invite experts from civil soci-
ety and the private sector to share their expertise and experiences in how we can overcome 
the challenges; this would be very useful for the June 2013 session, so that we can learn from 
other countries’ challenges and obstacles and how we can overcome them. This can serve as 
the starting point for a more concrete and solution-oriented approach for our work towards a 
key step towards higher ambition for a more ambitious outcome.  
(Nauru/UNFCCC 2013a) 
 
 
Developed countries not only presented their achievements and financial support 
for technology transfer and mainstreaming climate objectives, but also welcomed the 
progress via this process and congratulated the ‘frontrunners’ among the developing 
countries with positive recognition: 
 
I think it has been a very good debate and a clear sign. As Christiana [Figueres] said, a lot is 
happening. And sometimes you get the impression from this place that nothing is happening, 
but this is not the case. A lot is happening in developed and developing countries, not 
enough, but a lot. I think it would be very valuable to capture much of what has been said to-
day and to invite more additions from colleagues so that we can extract the lessons for learn-
ing in a more systematic way. REDD is another example, I don’t want to speak for Brazil, but 
they are a fantastic example and have done a great job in reducing deforestation over the past 
years, it’s been one of the great global successes. They have done it in part through policing 
and it is cost effective to farm land in a more effective way, so it’s both good for the climate, 
good for growth and for jobs, and we need to think about how we can generalize these sorts 
of lessons.  
(EU/ UNFCCC, 2013a). 
 
 
With the involvement of non-governmental actors such as the initiative of major 
cities C40, countries are reminded of the importance of implementation and the high 
support for climate legislation ‘on the ground’, i.e. by those who will need to deliver on 
the national targets: 
 
C40 described the cooperation between the cities [, which] seems to be the ideal way, and if 
we as governments could cooperate in the same way it would seem as if the situation was 
humming, and I wonder if there are some things that the UNFCCC can do to help catalyze 
action from sub-national entities. 
(United States/UNFCCC 2013a) 
 
This approach was continued at the June 2013 UNFCCC negotiations in 
Bonn with another workshop and roundtable on low carbon development, which 
has been seen as “really important to get into the conversation and to think about 
how we can scale up, this shows the benefits of this kind of workshop and roundta-
ble format. I think we are getting quite a lot of lessons and learning” (EU/UNFCCC 
2013b). Even poor developing countries such as Bangladesh now demand that the 
agreement must be “applicable to all; rules-based; predictable, robust, clear, en-
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forceable and scientifically-sound; and take into account long-term perspectives, 
[common but differentiated responsibilities] and equity, and loss and damage” 
(IISD 2013, p. 13). Overall, more and more developing countries are realizing that 
they are vulnerable to climate change. Remarkably, this not only results in in-
creased interest in adaptation, but also leads them to change their perspective re-
garding their own contribution to climate change. Like Kenya, Malaysia also ar-
rived at the conclusion that domestic climate legislation in the form of low carbon 
plans is beneficial in the long term: 
 
 
Malaysia’s communication on climate change published in 2010 has as its rationale that the 
continuing dependence on fossil fuels increased GHG, [what] made the country even more 
vulnerable to climate fluctuations and it further notes that economic competitiveness requires 
efficient energy production and energy consumption. The policy cites among its principles 
the importance of integrating climate change considerations into planning and implementa-
tion of national sustainable development plans on all levels of government that contribute to 
environmental conservation and use of natural resources and further highlights the import-
ance of the participation of stakeholders and major groups. 
(Malaysia/UNFCCC 2013b) 
 
 
 
6 Discussion and conclusion on reinforcing dynamics  
 
 
 
The dominant ‘win-lose’ frame of climate mitigation, which has hindered pro-
gress in the UNFCCC negotiations over the past 20 years, is beginning to be replaced by 
a ‘win-win’ framing that combines climate mitigation with low carbon development. 
The particular focus is on areas of ‘low hanging fruits’ such as energy efficiency and 
some forms of renewable energies. The UNFCCC is in a transitional phase as knowl-
edge transfer on low carbon development plans occurs not only at the margins of the ne-
gotiations, but also at its core. This facilitates the diffusion of low carbon development 
plans across countries in the form of national climate legislation. It is frequently based 
on other countries’ legislation and has been adapted to the domestic framework condi-
tions. The lesson-drawing consequently occurs as emulation, but also as hybridization, 
synthesis and inspiration when countries only combine different aspects or use these as 
ideas for developing their own policies (Rose 1991). 
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The inability of the UNFCCC to deliver the expected strong legally binding 
agreement at COP-15 in 2009 illustrates that the institutional architecture is a key de-
terminant for the rate of progress. Due to the high number of veto points such as the re-
quirement of consensus the UNFCCC is only capable of incremental steps, but these are 
insufficient to effectively address climate change within the closing window of opportu-
nity (IPCC 2007, 2013). The Copenhagen Summit 2009 however also had a positive ef-
fect, which can facilitate progress towards a post-Kyoto agreement. The deadline pres-
sure of COP-15 prompted many developed countries to set up climate legislation by 
2009 (Townshend et al. 2013, p. 20). The general consensus to negotiate a universal 
post-Kyoto agreement, the realization of co-benefits from climate mitigation and the an-
ticipation of international rules (Bernstein and Cashore 2012) encouraged developing 
countries to set up remarkable climate legislation before and after the Copenhagen 
summit. The presentations given by UNFCCC representatives in 2013 (UNFCCC 2013a, 
2013b) indicate that there is much more climate legislation ‘in the pipeline’ than cap-
tured by the GLOBE/LSE study (Townshend et al. 2013), which examined only 33 
countries but did not consider for example sub-national legislation, implementing pro-
grams/ strategies or small developing island states, many of which have pledged to be-
come carbon neutral by 2020 or 2030 (UNFCCC 2013a). Their rationale is to increase 
other countries’ ambitions by demonstrating ‘if even we can become carbon neutral, so 
should the developed countries and emerging economies’.  
These major developments towards a ‘win-win’ perspective and away from the 
1990s ‘win-lose’ paradigm within the UNFCCC negotiations are no coincidence. The 
institutional dynamics within UNFCCC shifted towards a policy diffusion and knowl-
edge transfer forum after the Durban negotiations with the Durban Platform on En-
hanced Action, which was brokered by the EU at the end of the Durban negotiations 
(Rajamani 2012). The set-up of the negotiations has been altered within the AWG-ADP 
work streams by introducing workshops and roundtables as the only negotiation arena at 
the negotiations in May 2013, thus forcing countries to listen to each other and invited 
experts. This process began with informal stakeholder roundtables under the Mexican/ 
South African Presidencies in 2010/2011.  
The UNFCCC motivated domestic climate legislation in compliance with inter-
national rules as ‘first pathway’ (Bernstein and Cashore 2012) for developed countries. 
Climate legislation in developing countries can be explained with the anticipation of in-
ternational rules in the future and the emerging international norm that developing coun-
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tries should try to move towards a low carbon development path that combines eco-
nomic growth with sustainable development and climate mitigation. Countries accepted 
this international norm in the AWG-ADP, which was adopted with consensus in 2011 
(Rajamani 2012). The ‘third pathway’ of markets has played a minor role in this case. 
The ‘fourth pathway’ on capacity building (Bernstein and Cashore 2012) is a crucial 
linkage between the action on the national level motivated by the Copenhagen Accords, 
the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2012b) and the emerging additional function of the 
UNFCCC as forum for knowledge transfer and experience exchange. It is thus evolving 
into a forum for capacity building. Consequently, the framework presented by Bernstein 
and Cashore (2012) can be regarded more as a cycle than a one-way path: international 
negotiations influence the domestic level, which in turn influences the international ne-
gotiations in their next cycle.  
This capacity building and information sharing at the heart of the formal negotia-
tions creates group pressure on countries to increase their ambition as a form of reinforc-
ing competition: very few countries are indecisive to appearing as laggard who blocks 
action on climate change. The precedent that led to the adoption of the Cancun Agree-
ments may have also contributed to this group pressure. When Bolivia objected and thus 
used its veto, it would have meant that the proposal for the Cancun Agreement had not 
been adopted by the UNFCCC. The Mexican presidency however overruled Bolivia’s 
objection, what resulted in standing ovations and cheerful relieve among all other dele-
gates present in the plenary hall (Interviews 2012). Consequently, the negotiation setting 
and the steering of the negotiation process are crucial determinants for the outcome. 
Modifications in the negotiation setting can have a positive influence on the negotiation 
process and ultimately facilitate an outcome. The UNFCCC negotiations in May 2013 
set aside the contact groups where countries repeat their national positions without en-
gaging with each other’s positions. It replaced these with workshops and roundtables, 
encouraging countries to present their progress in reducing emissions and encouraging 
others to follow their example. This type of negotiation setting facilitates support via ca-
pacity building, knowledge transfer, increases exposure of countries and applies pressure 
to justify inaction and blame avoidance.  
The diffusion literature has so far underestimated the importance of international 
negotiations as forum for knowledge transfer and the importance of positive reinforce-
ment across governance levels via group pressure and competition. Countries are begin-
ning to ‘buy in’ to the narrative of low carbon economic development emphasized by 
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individuals with leadership roles such as the UNFCCC Executive Secretaries and the 
UN Secretary General. Countries’ win-lose perspective and disagreements on who 
should take action is beginning to be replaced by the new development of a win-win 
framing that incorporates the element of positive competition and group pressure. This 
not only improves transparency and accountability in the climate negotiations, but also 
contributes to increasing countries’ ambition and stimulates their thinking on setting up 
and implementing ambitious domestic climate legislation. 
This bottom-up dynamic carries potential to be re-integrated into the top-down 
process of coordination within the UNFCCC, what will ultimately be necessary to coor-
dinate mitigation action towards achieving a 2°C target based on the Cancun Agree-
ments (UNFCCC 2010). The next ‘window of opportunity’ can open in 2015 (Jacobs 
2012) with the results of the 2013-2015 review conducted by the subsidiary bodies of 
the UNFCCC on the gap between countries’ aggregated individual mitigation efforts and 
the global 2°C target as well as the publication of the 5th assessment report of the IPCC 
(IPCC 2013). If countries begin to see the benefits of domestic climate mitigation, their 
international negotiation position can potentially shift to facilitate such a post-Kyoto 
agreement, which in turn can provide momentum for further, more ambitious domestic 
low carbon development legislation and investment security in low emission technolo-
gies for the private sector.  
Overall, these multilevel reinforcement dynamics between the international level 
that initiates responses on the national level, which in turn incrementally facilitates co-
operation on the international level, can contribute to a ‘re-unification’ of the frag-
mented climate regime under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. These findings carry wider implications for other areas of multilateral coopera-
tion that merit further investigation. Key elements are the willingness of actors to reflect 
on the experience of ‘negotiation failure’ such as the Copenhagen summit in 2009 and to 
explore alternative modes of interaction such as non-negotiation settings. These allow 
exploring win-win opportunities and involving experts that provide ‘neutral’ input in the 
search for an approach that is acceptable to all negotiation parties involved. This re-
quires actors to step back from politically deadlocked situations to assess the broader 
picture and mid- to long-term interests to go beyond a distributional zero-sum game by 
identifying mutual long-term objectives. 
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